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Marital Property Rights of the
Non-Native in a Community
Property State*
By Noiavr L. LAY*"
THE attorney in the community property state has had more experi-
ence with the problems created by an interstate change of domicile
than has his common law counterpart. At least, more cases have been
decided with reference to the effect of a move from a common law
state to a community property jurisdiction than have arisen in con-
nection with the opposite move. A comparison of the methods used
by the community states in their approach to the problem reveals
certain similarities to the ones adopted by the common law states.
The manner of their decision and the difficulties they have encountered
may be of some assistance to the attorney in the common law state
who is attempting to advise his mobile client. Likewise, it may be
helpful m drafting legislation for use in the common law state.
1. Arizona
In Stephen v. Stephen' the spouses were marred in a state where
the common law prevailed and, upon a visit to Anzona, the husband
purchased some real estate with funds acquired in the common law
jurisdiction. This purchase money was classified as his separate prop-
erty The parties never changed their domicile, but upon the death
of the husband a dispute arose over the attenipted classification of the
Arizona realty as community property The court found that when
spouses acquire property during coverture which,.according to the law
of their domicile, is the separate property of one of them, it is not
converted into community property by its removal to a state where
that property system is in force. To do so would raise serious con-
stitutional questions inasmuch as it would destroy vested rights. It
would take from one spouse property over which he or she had com-
plete control and vest some interest in the other. If the owner happened
to be the wife not only would her legal title be destroyed but the
* This article is a portion of a paper which will be submitted in partial fulfillment
of the requirements for an advanced degree at the Umversity of Michigan Law School.
** Assistant Professor of Law, University of Louisville.
136 Ariz. 235, 284 Pac. 158 (1930).
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husband would have the right of management and control over the
property if it be categorized as community As such, it could be held
liable for certain debts created by him regardless of whether she con-
sented to their creation.
Although the property brought to Arizona was personalty and the
property involved was realty, it was deemed to be the husband's
separate property notwithstanding this transmutation. It was felt that
the same rule should be applied whether the property retained its
original form or had been subsequently exchanged for other personalty
or invested in realty located there.
In support of its decision, the court held that when spouses acquire
property it is presumed that they do so in view of the law as it exists
at that time and place. Its character as community or separate is deter-
mined by this first acquisition. In short, the characteristics of the
original property will be traced through the transmutation. This does
not mean that the parties may not convert their separate property into
community, for certainly the spouse who owns separate property may
give a community interest therein to the other spouse just as he or she
may give some other interest to. the marital partner. The statement
has reference to the fact that a mere investment alone does not produce
such an effect.
Arizona has never considered this problem when the introduction
of the property into the state was accompamed by a change of domicile
on the part of the owners, but a statute provides that the marital rights
in any property acquired in Arizona by spouses who move there after
being married elsewhere shall be controlled by the laws of Arizona.2
This should not be interpreted to mean that all subsequent acquisi-
tions shall be deemed community On the contrary, in the above case
the court cited with approval those decisions from other community
states, in this type of factual situation, holding that the property was
not converted into community property by virtue of the change of
domicile nor by its exchange for other property The court will recog-
nize the separate character of such property transported into the state
and will protect the interest of the owner.
The statute does little more than codify the doctrine that the laws
of the domicile govern the acquisitions of its residents. However, such
determination is not made without any reference to the nature of the
purchase price involved. This is not unlike the position taken in some
of the common law jurisdictions where community funds have been
invested in realty Notwithstanding the application of the law of the
2Am. REv. STAT. ANN. § 25-217 (1956).
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situs (common law state), the community interests of each spouse
have been protected 3 This protection was effectuated through the use
of the law of the situs and not in spite of it.
The statute will apply directly to any acquisitions made with funds
accumulated in Arizona after the move. In that event, the property
will be separate4 or community5 according to the law of Arizona with-
out any reference to the law of the state from which the parties moved.
II. California
The first case of this nature presented to a court m California in-
volved a couple that had married in Illinois and moved to California
bringing with them a considerable amount of money which was later
invested in real estate located there.6 By the statutes of Illinois, per-
sonal property acquired by a husband and wife through their joint
efforts was the separate property of the husband, but by the law of
California it would have become community property The wife filed
an action for a divorce wherein she claimed that the land was com-
munity property and asked that one-half of it be rewarded to her.
In refusing her request, the court held that the purchase money
was the separate property of the husband when the spouses moved
to California, and the character thereof was not changed by its mtro-
duction into the community state. If the money wherewith the land
was purchased was separate property then the land itself would like-
wise be the separate property of the husband.
This continued to be the position taken by the courte until 1917
when the legislature redefined community property to encompass any
property acquired by either the husband or the wife, or both, after
their marriage, including realty located m Califorma and "personal
property wherever situated, acquired while domiciled elsewhere, which
would not have been the separate property of either if acquired while
domiciled m this state."'
3 Depas v. Mayo, 11 Mo. 314, 49 Am. Dec. 88 (1848); Edwards v. Edwards, 108
Okla. 93, 233 Pac. 477 (1924).
4 Aaiz. Prv. STAT. AwN. § 25-213 (1956).
5 Am. REv. STAT. ANN. § 25-211 (1956).
6 Kraemer v. Kraemer, 52 Cal. 302 (1877).
7 For other cases decided prior to 1917, see Estate of Niccolls, 164 Cal. 368, 129
Pac. 278 (1912); Estate of Burrows, 136 Cal. 113, 68 Pac. 488 (1902); Estate of
Higgins, 65 Cal. 407, 4 Pac. 389 (1884). See also Estate of Warner, 167 Cal. 686, 140
Pac. 583 (1914) where the court applied the same reasoning when the spouses remained
m the common law state and only the funds were sent to California and invested in real
estate.
8 Cal. Stat. 1917, ch. 581, § 1, at 827.
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Soon after the adoption of tins amendment, the court mentioned
in dictum that it would have no application to an estate of a person
who died before its promulgation although his estate was being ad-
ministered after its effective date.9 Then a case, concerning the ad-
mimstration of a California resident's estate, was presented to the
court where it was necessary to interpret the amendment and to deter-
mine its scope and coverage. 10 Included in the estate was the personal
property acquired while the spouses were domiciled in a common law
state and the rents and profits accumulated from this personalty after
they moved to the community state. All of the property had been
brought to California prior to the enactment of the amendment to the
community property statute. The state sought to collect an inheritance
tax on all of the property passng to the wife, but she objected and
claimed that one-half of it did not pass to her by any provision of her
husband's will since it was community property by virtue of the 1917
amendment. Her opponent argued that the amendment was uncon-
stitutional insofar as it sought to convert a spouse's separate property,
theretofore recognized as such by the law of California, into com-
munity property It was also contended that the statute should not
be given a retroactive effect.
The court held the amendment to be inapplicable in this particular
factual situation because the property had been accumulated and
brought into the state prior to its passage, and a provision of the
California Code prohibited a statute from being retroactively applied
unless it specifically so provided.'- No. such intention had been ex-
pressed by the legislature. Since it was not to be construed retro-
spectively, but was to be given only a prospective application the
court found it unnecessary to decide the question of its constitution-
ality. The court was careful to explain that it was not deciding whether
the legislature had the ability to exempt this property from the state
inheritance taxes or could provide that the wife could succeed to
one-half of it. Even conceding such power, it had not been exercised
by this amendment since it wa' not a succession statute,
Following the court's refusal to apply the statute retrospectively,
the definition of community property was again amended in an en-
deavor to give it a retroactive effect. The new amendment specifically
included this property within its ambit irrespective of whether it was
acquired before or after the passage of this act.'2 In construing this
9 Estate of Arms, 186 Cal. 554, 563, 199 Pac. 1053, 1056 (1921).
0 Estate of Frees, 187 Cal. 150, 201 Pac. 112 (1921).
11 CAL. Civ. CoDE § 3.
12 Cal. Stat. 1923, ch. 360, § 1, at 746.
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new provision the court refused to apply it to property brought into
California, from a common law state, prior to its adoption, stating
that the husband had a vested interest in any personalty brought by
him into that state as his separate property-' This vested interest
remained unaffected by either the move or the amendment.
In the face of these two amendments, the California Courts of
Appeal continued to hold, in apparent reliance upon the California
Supreme Court's decision that they should not be applied retroactively,
that they did not even affect the character of the husband's separate
property brought into the state,:4 nor any real estate purchased there-
with,'" after their adoption.
The California Supreme Court later reached the same result in
the case of Estate of Thornton 6 where it was asked to determine the
constitutionality of that section of the statute relating to personal
property brought into the state after its enactment. In holding this
portion of the enactment to be violative of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment to the Constitution of the United States, the court stated that:
If the right of a husband, a citizen of California, as to his separate
property, is a vested one and may not be impaired or taken by Cali-
forma law, then to disturb m the same manner the same property
right of a citizen of another state, who chances to transfer his dorm-
cile to this state, bringing his property with him, is clearly to abridge
the privileges and immunities of the citizen.17
Not only would such a statute violate the equal protection clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment, but to take the property of one spouse,
or some interest therein, and transfer it to the other because of a change
of domicile would also result in the taking of property without due
process of law
Before the Thornton case can be fully appraised as to its correct-
ness the amendment and its intended effect must be analyzed. The
amendment involved was a general one extending the definition of
community property to include all personal property acquired else-
where which would have been community if the spouses had been
domiciled in California at the date of its acquisition.'8 This enlarge-
ment seems innocuous enough when viewed alone. However, when it
is considered together with other statutes governing the respective
I3 Estate of Dnshaus, 199 Cal. 369, 249 Pac. 515 (1926).
14 Scott v. Remley, 119 Cal. App. 384, 6 P.2d 536 (1931); Estate of Bruggemeyer,
115 Cal. App. 525, 2 P.2d 534 (1931).
15 Melvm v. Carl, 118 Cal. App. 249, 4 P.2d 954 (1931).
16 1 Cal. 2d 1, 33 P.2d 1 (1934).
17 1d. at 5, 33 P.2d at 3.
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interests of each spouse in the community property its effect is far-
reaching. For example, the husband has the general power to manage
and control the community 19 Hence, if the property brought into the
state belonged to the wife she would lose her managerial rights therein.
Likewise, if the property belonged to the husband, he, irrespective of
the fact that he retains the right to manage it, would be limited in
making a disposition thereof. He could not make a gift of it nor dis-
pose of it for less than an adequate consideration without the wife's
consent.20 In either event, valuable property interests which each
possessed prior to the change of domicile would be lost by their re-
moval to California. Since these interests were vested their destruction
in such a fashion would amount to a deprivation of property without
due process ,of law
Furthermore, the California courts have consistently held that even
the husband's interest in existing community property cannot be de-
stroyed by subsequent legislation nor can his rights in his separate
estate be taken from him.21 Thus, by altering the vested interests of
the husband in his separate property acquired elsewhere, the court
would be applying two standards: one for native Californians and one
for marital partners who chanced to move there. Such a distinction
would abridge the privileges and immunities of citizens from sister
states. The fact that the property would have been community had
the spouses resided. in California at the time of acquisition is in this
contest immatenal. Any interests in personalty are obtained at the
date of acquisition and the exact nature of those interests should be
determined by the law of the spouses' domicile as of that date. Once
vested interests are acquired they remain until voluntarily disposed
of, or until they are taken with due process.
Naturally, the spouses could agree to exchange their respective
interests in the property acquired prior to- the move for community
property interests. There would then be neither a problem of due
process nor of equal protection inasmuch as the parties had consented
to this divestiture and realignment of property interests. However, the
court in the Thornton case refused to accept the argument that a
change of domicile, accompanied by an importation of the property
into the state, could be construed as an implied consent to a submis-
18 Cal. Stat. 1923, ch. 360, § 1, at 746.
19 CAL. Civ. CODE § 161a.
20 CAL. Civ. CoDE § § 172, 172a.
21McKay v. Launston, 204 Cal. 557, 269 Pac. 519 (1928); Roberts v. Wehmeyer,
191 Cal. 601, 218 Pac. 22 (1923); Spreckles v. Spreckles, 116 Cal. 339, 48 Paa. 228
(1897).
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sion to the provisions of the statute. Any such assumption would be
fallacious and unreasonable. There is no doubt that the law of
California would apply to future acquisitions and perhaps also to the
interests obtained by spouses in property received in exchange for the
husband's separate property While this is not ordinarily thought of
in terms of consent but in terms of the application of the domiciliary
law, the parties have actually consented by moving into the state. But
such was not the case in Thornton. The property involved was the
same as that brought into Califorma from the common law state. Im-
plied consent was held not to suffice in this situation.
In arriving at the decision, the court considered the statute as one
that wrought an alteration in the vested property interests of the
spouses merely because of their moving to California. Once the court
had so construed the enactment there was no other alternative but to
declare it unconstitutional.
Another possible approach should be considered. In Thornton the
husband was deceased and the wife was claiming that, under the
amendment, the personalty was community property and, as such,
she was entitled to one-half thereof. Under the California Probate
Code the surviving spouse would receive that percentage of the com-
munity upon the death of the other.22 Viewed in this light, the narrow
question before the court was not whether the statute had altered
the rights of either spouse during their joint lifetimes. Rather, it was
whether the statute would be used to determine the ability of the
decedent to dispose of his property by testamentary disposition. The
actual question is then whether California can require that, upon the
death of a spouse domiciled in that state, property owned by hun
and brought into the state shall be governed by the same rules of
succession and testamentary disposition as community property ac-
quired there. The answer is undoubtedly in the affirmative. Almost
without exception, the general conflicts rule has been adopted that
the right of a decedent to dispose of his personal property, as well as
the right of the surviving spouse to receive a share thereof, is totally
dependent upon the law of the state where the spouses were domiciled
at the time of death. Likewise, these rights can be enlarged or dimin-
ished without running afoul of the constitutional guarantee of due
process.23 Therefore, the statute, if construed as one of succession,
2 2 CAL. PROB. CODE § 201.
2 3 The United States Supreme Court at an early date recogmzed that these rights
were subject to state statutory control and could be modified without ievolving con-
stitutional prohibitions. Magoun v. Illinois Trust & Sav. Bank, 170 U.S. 283 (1898).
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would clearly be valid. This was the approach taken in the dissenting
opiion but the majority refused to so classify it.
Assuming that the statute had been upheld under the particular
facts at bar as one of succession, further problems would have arisen
in the future. In each succeeding case the court would be called upon
to look at the facts to see if the amended statute affected property
rights of living spouses because of some other statutory provision ap-
plicable to community property If so, it might be unconstitutional to
apply it to those facts. Conversely, if the facts were of such a nature
as to show that the marital relationship had been terminated by death,
the statute could be legitimately applied. While the court could surely
have done this it would have been unreasonable for it to take such
a circuitous route to uphold the constitutionality of a general statute
when applied to a question of succession and testamentary distribu-
tion since the legislature could have adopted a valid succession statute
had it so desired.
As far as the duty of a court to make a reasonable effort to garner
the intent of the legislature in interpreting a statute, it appears that
the court did just that. If this was intended as a statute of succession
the legislature could have easily said so, or enacted it as an amendment
to the succession statutes of the Probate Code as opposed to using it to
enlarge the definition of community property with all of the attending
circumstances created by other presently existing statutes relating to
the community
Although the character of a husband's separate property is not
altered by a change of domicile the rights of his wife are definitely
affected by the move. This was aptly illustrated in O'Connor v.
O'Connor 4 where the husband moved to Califorma after his marriage
in Indiana. He died testate having devised all of his property to some-
one other than his wife. Under the law of Indiana the wife was entitled
to a statutory share of the personal property of the husband upon his
death, while under California law the separate property of the husband
could be devised as he saw fit.
In holding that the right of the husband to dispose of his separate
property was to be governed by the law of Califorma where he was
domiciled, the court stated that the fact the husband's power to dis-
pose of his personalty by will m Indiana was subject to the wife's right
to a portion thereof only gave her an expectancy which depended
upon survivorship to become a vested right. This being true, and he
having established a domicile in California before his death, the prop-
24218 Cal. 518, 23 P.2d 1031 (1933).,
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erty was subject to the law of that jurisdiction winch would control.
the distribution of the property whether or not the husband left a will.
As a result, the wife got nothing and was thus deprived of interests
in the property accumulated prior to the move. She was not given the
rights of a widow under the law of Indiana nor was she accorded any
protection under the California law since the husband could dispose
of has separate property in any manner suitable to his desires.
This case is not used for the purpose of criticizmg the legal reason-
mg of the court since there is no legal basis upon winch it may be at-
tacked. However, it does show that the property interests protected
under the rule in Thornton are vested interests and not mere expec-
tancies dependent upon survivorship for their maturation into posses-
sion and enjoyment. Such expectancies are affected by the change of
domicile since the law of the domicile is determinative of their
existence.
Although there was no error committed in the O'Connor case, it
is just as clear that the wife did not receive the benefit of the law of
either state even though they were both enacted for her protection.
The wife's statutory share under the law of Indiana was designed to
protect her against a husband who might otherwise devise or bequeath
all of his property to someone else. The necessity for such an enact-
ment is obvious. Since the wife has no interest in the property of the
husband accumulated after marriage should could be left penniless
and destitute if the husband desired to place her in such a position.
Tins would be true even though she had rendered valuable services
in performing her duties, under the marital relationship, winch had
actually benefitted the husband and aided hmi in the accumulation
of tins property. Thus, it is to prevent such an injustice winch might
eventually result in the wife becoming a charge upon the state that
the statutory share was conceived.
On the other hand, the wife, under the law of California, has a
one-half interest in all property accumulated after the marriage as her
share of the community Upon the death of the husband she becomes
entitled to this one-half without any restrictions and the husband may
not dispose of it in contravention of this right.25 The underlying theory
behind this doctrine is that each marital partner has contributed
toward the accumulation of the property although it may have all
been acquired by the labor of the husband.26 The wife has performed
2 5 CAL. PNoB. CoDE § 201.
2 6 For an excellent discussion of the underlying theory behind the community
property concept, see Hine, Commentary on the Community Property Law of Texas, 13
Tm. Crv. STAT. ANN. § 1 (Vernon 1960).
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other valuable services during the marriage albeit they may have been
in some other area of the conjugal relationship than working for wages.
The wife, by receiving her share of the community, will be isolated
against a deprivation of all property by her husband's testamentary
disposition. Therefore, he may dispose of his separate property as he
desires.2 7
Viewed in this light, it can be seen that when the husband can
dispose of his separate property that was accumulated in Indiana
without any corresponding right in the wife to any portion thereof,
he has in essence effectively prevented her from receiving the pro-
tection intended by the laws of either state. Nevertheless, under the
then existing Califoria law he had a perfect legal right to do just
that since the law of his domicile was determinative of his ability
to dispose of his personalty and the wife had no vested interests therein.
In an effort to partially alleviate the plight of the migrant wife,
the Califormia Legislature in 1935 added a new section to the Probate
Code, providing that upon the death of either the husband or wife,
the survivor was entitled to "one-half of all personal property, wherever
situated, heretofore or-hereafter acquired after marriage by either
husband or wife, or both, while domiciled elsewhere, which would
not have been the separate property of either if acquired while
domiciled in this state."28 The remaining one-half was subject to the
testamentary disposition of the decedent. 9
A deficiency was discovered in the statute in the case of In re
Miller3 where the husband acquired property while domiciled in Iowa
which would not have been classified as his separate property had
the spouses been residing in Califormia at the time of its acquisition.
They later moved to Califorma where part of the personalty was in-
vested in real estate. At the husband's death, the wife sought one-half
of the realty under the new section of the Probate Code. The court
held that the statute did not apply to real estate purchased after the
move with separate funds of one of the spouses acquired elsewhere,
but applied only to the personalty owned by the decedent at his death.
It was not limited to the personalty that was in the same form as it
was when introduced into the state but included all personalty regard-
less of any subsequent transmutations. The court thought that if the
2 7 CAL. PROB. CODE § 20.
28 CAL. PROB. CODE § 201.5.
29 For discussions of the effect of thfs enactment, see Abel, Estate Planning for
the Non-Native Son, 41 CAlIF. L. RE:v. 230 (1953); Comment, 19 So. CAL. L. REv.
39 (1945).
3031 Cal. 2d 191, 187 P.2d 722 (1947), 21 So. CAL. L. REv. 390 (1948).
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legislature had meant to include real estate purchased with the
separate funds after the move, it would have so stipulated.31
With respect to the validity of the new statute, the court held that
"unlike the earlier legislation which had been declared unconstitu-
tional, this statute does not purport to rearrange property rights be-
tween living husbands and wives. .. [O1n the contrary, it is a succes-
sion statute. ",32 The legislature apparently enacted this statute
as a part of the Probate Code pursuant to the theory advanced in the
dissenting opinion in Thornton, i.e., that legislation affecting or alter-
ng the method of descent or testamentary distribution of property will
not contravene any constitutional guarantees. These are matters which
are wholly within the statutory control of the decedent's domicile. It
was upon this basis that the court could easily distinguish this statute
from the one involved in Thornton which enlarged the definition of
community property with all of the resulting effects. The statute here
was more limited in scope and was truly a succession statute within
the power of the domiciliary state.
Another unforeseen difficulty arose in connection with the construc-
tion of the new section when a wife, predeceasing her husband, left
a will disposing of all her property 3 3 Her devisees claimed that the
bequest included not only her separate estate but also one-half of the
husband's separate property acquired after the marriage and brought
with them to California. This argument was premised upon the fact
that the new statute provided that one-half of such property was sub-
ject to the testamentary disposition of the decedent with the survivor
being entitled to the other one-half.
The court disagreed holding that so much of the new section as
purported to give a person the power to dispose of the property of
another, or curtailed his rights therein during his lifetime, was arbi-
trary and unconstitutional. It was deemed to be violative of the due
process clause and abridged the privileges and immunities of a citizen.
Therefore, the wife had no right to devise any portion of the property
accumulated by her husband prior to the change of domicile as his
separate property
To remedy these two deficiencies, the statute was amended in 1957
to include any Califorma real estate acquired in exchange for real or
personal property amassed after the marriage if it would have been
31 The appellate courts had taken the view that such real estate was subject to the
provsons of the statute. In re Ways Estate, 157 P.2d 46 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1945).
32 31 Cal. 2d at 196, 187 P.2d at 725.
83 Paley v. Bank of Amenca Nat'l Trust & Say. Ass'n, 159 Cal. App. 2d 500, 324
P.2d 35 (1958).
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community property had the spouses been domiciled in California at
the time of its acquisition.34 Also, the amendment restricted the testa-
mentary power of disposition to the property in the "decedent's estate"
so that the first spouse to die could not devise the separate property
of the survivor, t.e., the property that was separate under the laws of
the state where the parties were domiciled at the date of acquisition.85
The statute was amended again in 1961'o so that it now reads:
Upon the death of any married person domiciled in this State one-half
of the following property in his estate shall belong to the surviving
spouse and the other one-half of such property is subject to the testa-
mentary disposition of the decedent, and in the absence thereof goes
to the survivmg spouse: all personal property wherever situated and
all real property situated in this State heretofore or hereafter ac-
quired:
(a) By the decedent while domiciled elsewhere which would
have been the community property of the decedent and the sur-
vivmg spouse had the decedent been donmciled in this state at the
time of its acquisition; or
(b) In exchange for real or personal property, wherever situated,
acquired other than by gift, devise, bequest or descent by the dece-
dent during the marriage while donciled elsewhere.37
This statute protects the wifes rights upon the death of her
husband, but it makes no provision for her interests if the marriage is
terminated prior to his death. However, a new classification of prop-
erty was added to the Civil Code which gave her additional protec-
tion. 8 It was termed quasi-community property and was defined as
personal property located anywhere and real property located in
California that was acquired by either spouse after their marriage,
while living elsewhere, which would have been community property
if it had been acquired while the parties were domiciled in Califorma.
At the same time, the legislature provided the manner in which this
quasi-community property would be distributed when a court entered
a decree for separate maintenance,39 divorce40 or child support.4 The
34 Cal. Stat. 1957, ch. 490, § 1, at 1521. For an article on the 1957 amendment and
some of its deficiencies, see Abel, Barry, Halsted & Marsh, Rights of a Surviving Spouse
in Property Acquired by a Decedent While Domiciled Outside California, 47 CAI.
L. 1Ev. 211 (1959).
35 Cal. Stat. 1957, ch. 490, § 1, at 1521.36 Cal. Stat. 1961, ch. 636, § 22, at 1844.
3 7 CAL.. PROB. CoDE § 201.5.
38 CAr. Crv. Cous § 140.5. Tins new type of property is discussed by Schreter,
"Quasi-Community Property" in the Conflict of Laws, 50 CArMF. L. Ftlv. 206 (1962).
39 CAL. Civ. CoDEu § 146.
40 Ibid.
41 CAL. Crv. CODE § 143.
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distribution followed the identical pattern as that outlined for the
community property upon the happening of the same events.
It was not until 1965, however, that the constitutionality of the
quasi-community legislation, as it applies to a divorce, was resolved.
In the already quite well known case of Addison v. Addison4 2 the issue
was resolved in the affirmative. The Addisons were married in Illinois
where they continued to reside for some ten years prior to their re-
moval to California in 1949. At the time of the move they brought a
sizeable amount of assets with them, all of which had been accumu-
lated by the husband's business enterprises in Illinois, and the vast
majority of which had been amassed subsequent to their marriage.
The wife filed suit for divorce in 1961, and requested an equitable
division of the marital property. She also attempted to avail herself
of the then recently adopted quasi-community property statute by
asserting that the property being held in the husband's name had been
acquired with, or received in exchange for, the property originally
obtained in Illinois during their marriage, and that this would not have
been his separate property if the spouses had been domiciled in
California at the date of its acquisition. In short, she was contending
that this property came squarely under the purview of the quasi-
community definition thus enabling the court to order an equitable
distribution thereof when the marriage was dissolved by divorce. 43
The trial court ruled that the quasi-community legislation was uncon-
stitutional, and held that the property standing in the husband's name
alone was his separate property in which the wife had no interest.
In reversing the lower court, the Supreme Court of California care-
fully considered the exact nature, and the scope of the coverage, of
the legislation in order to ascertain whether it differed from that de-
clared unconstitutional in Thornton and, if so, to what extent. Revert-
ing to the legislation interpreted in Thornton it is seen that it attempted
to expand the definition of community property to include all real
property located in Califorma and all personal property which would
not have been the separate property of either spouse if they had
been domiciled in California at the date of its acquisition.44 No
limitations were placed upon this expansion. On the contrary, it was
of general application and carmed with it all of the attendant rights
and disabilities of the community property law that were contained
in any other statutes or judicial opinions appertaining thereto. And
42 62 Cal. 2d 558, 43 CaL Rptr. 97, 399 P.2d 897 (1965).
43 See CAL. Crv. CoDE § 146.
44 Statutes cited notes 8, 12 supra.
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what did the spouses have to do to become subject to, and to have
their property interests governed by, this statute? Nothing more than
to change their domicile to California, and it was upon this basis that
it was rendered unconstitutional in Thornton.
Was the present legislation materially different? Addison held yes
and noted that, unlike the old statute, the quasi-community property
legislation did not purport to rearrange presently existing property
rights of the parties merely because they chanced to move to Cali-
fornia. It made no attempt to alter vested rights as the border was
crossed. The legislation is brought into effect when an action for
divorce or separate maintenance is filed subsequent to the change of
domicile. Thus, the concept is applicable only if, after the acquisition
of the California domicile, certain acts or events occur which give rise
to such a cause of action. "These acts or events," continued the court,
"are not necessarily connected with a change of domicile at all."' In
fact, these are acts that are voluntarily committed by one of the spouses
without any relevancy to the move.
After pointing out this pregnant difference in the two pieces of
legislation, the court confronted the new statute with the arguments
advanced in Thornton. First, the court felt that it could not be success-
fully argued that the quasi-community property legislation violated
the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United
States Constitution. In support of this view. it took notice of the salient
difference between the taking of property without due process and
a taking with due process. In many situations, property rights are
seriously inpaired and in some instances completely destroyed with
constitutional acquiescence when some public interest compels or
justifies the taking, and where the taking is not discriminatory. This
is done under the inherent power of the state to regulate the activities
and conduct of its own citizens, and this police power may validly be
used to interfere with so-called vested rights where it is reasonably
necessary for the protection of the health, safety or general welfare
of the public. Under this approach, the emphasis is not whether there
has been a taking of property, for there quite obviously has been, but
whether the taking was necessitated by the public welfare so as to
overcome the constitutional prohibition of the due process clause.
Such reasoning leads to a weighing of the interests of the state against
those of the individual whose property rights are being adversely
affected in order to determine whether the taking is a justifiable and
reasonable one or whether it is arbitrary and capricious. The court
45 62 Cal. 2d at 566, 43 Cal. Rptr. at 102, 399 P.2d at 902.
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held that the current domiciliary state has a substantial interest in
the property rights of the parties when their marrage is dissolved by
a divorce, and that, under these circumstances, the quasi-community
property legislation was a valid exercise of the inherent police power
of the state.
Undoubtedly the court was correct in assigning a substantial inter-
est to the state in the instant situation inasmuch as the overwhelming
majority of the property m question would have been the husband's
separate property but for the quasi-community characterization. Since
the court was powerless to award any portion of the separate property
of one spouse to the other m the divorce proceeding,4 the wife would
have received very little under the law of Califorma. She would also
have been deprived of any rights she might previously have had under
the law of Illinois for the spouses were no longer domiciled there. She
would have, therefore, been demed the protection of the laws of both
states. The court specifically referred to this somewhat alarming possi-
bility and held that, when these facts exist, "the state has a very sub-
stantial interest and one sufficient to provide for a fair and equitable
distribution of the marital property without running afoul of the due
process clause. "17 Otherwise, she might be left penniless with the
possible result of her becoming a charge upon the state. Viewed m
tis light, the interest of the state in according her adequate protection
is obvious.
But will the same interest be present or a similar rationalization be
applicable if the wife has no real need for protection, z.e., where she
has ample assets of her own to insure her continued existence in the
same fashion to which she was accustomed prior to the divorce?
Furthermore, the wife, in the present case, was granted a divorce be-
cause of her husband's infidelity and it was from the adulterous spouse
that the otherwise separate property was being sought by the applica-
tion of the quasi-community legislation. In reference to this fact, the
court ruled that the state has a substantial interest where the innocent
party would be left unprotected. Is the court indicating that both
factors must concur prior to a proper invocation of the statute? Must
the individual seeking to avail himself or herself of these benefits be
both innocent and destitute? Certainly the legislation itself does not
indicate this. If the divorce is granted for any reason other than
adultery, extreme cruelty or incurable insanity the statute commands
4 0 Garten v. Garten, 140 Cal. App. 2d 489, 295 P.2d 23 (1956); Barker v. Barker,
139 Cal. App. 2d 206, 293 P.2d 85 (1956).
47 62 Cal. 2d at 567, 43 Cal. Rptr. at 103, 399 P.2d at 903.
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an equal distribution of the quasi-community property irrespective of
the relative wealth of either spouse and without any thought being
given to the one whose conduct fostered the divorce action.48 On the
other hand, if the divorce is granted for any of the three aforemen-
tioned grounds, the court is enjoined to partition this property between
the spouses in such proportion as it may deem just after having con-
sidered all the facts of the case together with the condition of the
spouses.49 This does indicate that some consideration is given to the
factors of guilt and potential need as regards the final division of the
property, but it in no way makes these two elements prerequisites to
the receipt of any of it.
Apparently the court did not intend for its decision to turn upon
these two factors because it previously stated, without any allusion
to the individual need or relative guilt of either spouse, that the
domiciliary state has an interest in the marital property rights when-
ever a marriage is dissolved through a divorce. Perhaps, the court's
subsequent reference to these facts was only intended as additional
proof of the substantial interest of the state in protecting the wife
against a loss of all property rights. Nevertheless, it may return to
haunt the court in subsequent questions pertaining to the quasi-
community legislation and will have to be explained or clarified at that
time. In any event, it would appear that the balancing of interests
theory could be used even where the wife has adequate assets of her
own. The interest of the state in treating all of its domiciliaries, whether
native or not, as much alike as possible nught very well outweigh any
resulting property losses to one of the spouses as a result thereof.
It is quite clear that Addison does undermine to a considerable
degree the logic of Thornton where similar rights were deemed mvio-
late, but it should be noted that Thornton was not overruled. In reality,
the legislation in question in the two cases was very different. Even
applying the Addison reasoning to Thornton, the legislation there
should still be held unconstitutional for it attempted to recharacterize
separate property into community merely because of the change of
domicile. It is hard to visualize the interest of the state being pre-
dominant until some act is committed or some event occurs therein
which gives rise to the state's interest. It would appear that an interest
in both the state and the individual is necessary to their being weighed
and evaluated. Even under Addison a general recharacterization seems
dubious. Certainly the decision does not hold this.
48 CAL. Civ. CoDE § 146(b).
4 9 CAL. Crv. Coin § 146(a).
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Conversely, even under Thornton the legislation in Addison could
be upheld by an application of a consent theory. The majority opinion
in Thornton indicated that under the appropriate fact situations the
spouses nght be presumed to have consented to their property inter-
ests being governed by the law of California, but they were unwilling
to extend this doctrine so as to miply such consent merely because
of the change of domicile. Additional factors must be present, and in
Addison more grounds for an iplied consent are in existence. One
spouse has committed an act or acts wnch permitted the other to
obtain a divorce. The acts were perpetrated in California, the spouses
were domiciled there, the divorce was granted there and their prop-
erty is located within the confines of that state. Hence, can the husband
complain that he is being deprived of some property interest without
due process when he himself set the machinery into motion that
eventually resulted in the reallocation or distribution of the property?
His consent could have been implied had the court desired to use this
approach.
As between these two possibilities, the court's use of the police
power to uphold the legislation was the preferable one if the state
is interested in uniformity in its treatment of the property rights of
all its domiciliaries as it obviously is in light of the many abortive at-
tempts by the legislature to achieve this end. The police power theory
is of a broader potential scope. The balancing of interests between
the state and the individual could result in the constitutionality of
expanded legislation in tins area whereas the court might be hard put
to justifiably imply consent of the property owner where only little
action is taken by the spouse. It is easier to assess a substantial interest
to the state than to imply consent.
Secondly, the court demed that the quasi-community legislation
abridged the privileges and immunities clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. While Thornton held that the legislation there involved
impinged upon the right of an individual to maintain his domicile in
any state without the loss of vested property interests, such was not
the case in Addison. The present legislation in no way impinged upon
vested rights because of the change of domicile. The concept of quasi-
community property came into existence when the divorce was
granted. Addison did not take issue with the language of Thornton as
it pertained to the privileges and imunities clause but simply held
that the two pieces of legislation were easily distinguishable. One law
review comment has suggested that Addison should have dealt
squarely with the problem instead of distinguishing the two statutes
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and should have attacked the Thornton position.r° The rationale ap-
pears to be that since the non-domiciliary does not have a constitution-
ally guaranteed right to retain all of the marital property rights he
acquired in his former domicile, he does not have any other rights
that will be impinged because of a general reclassification of the prop-
erty upon the change of domicile. The question is posed that "if he
is not necessarily suffering a loss of property without due process of
law, a right one has as a United States citizen, when his marital prop-
erty interests are dimished on a change of domicile, as Addison holds
he is not, then what federally created right is he being denied the
privilege of retaining?" 1 This may sound good but let us examine the
main premise. The court did hold that property rights could be dimin-
ished with due process but it in no way gives consent to a destruction
of all rights under any 6ircumstances. Under the due process argument
these rights may be interfered with only when the interest of the state
outweighs that of the individual. He still retains all other property
rights and these should not be abridged merely because of the change
of domicile. Any other interests should be protected. Neither did the
court, as the question indicates, state that the owner was not being
deprived of property without due process when his interests are dimin-
ished on a change of domicile. The court was very careful to point
out that this was not the fact. The legislation became operative only
upon the awarding of the divorce. It was at this point that the states
interest was ascertained and not at the earlier date. In fact, this is the
crucial difference between Addison and Thornton.
Thirdly, it was contended that the quasi-community property legis-
laton might be unconstitutional under section 2 of article IV of the
United States Constitution which provides that "The Citizens of each
State shall be entitled to all privileges and mimunities of Citizens in
the several States." The argument was premised upon the refusal of
California to retroactively alter or interfere with the vested property
rights of its own citizens with the attending conclusion that it must
therefore render the same treatment to citizens from other states. Ad-
mitting that this prohibition prevents any discrimination against
citizens from other states where there is no justification for such dis-
crepancy other than they were at one time citizens of another state,
it is not an absolute. It does not bar some disparity where there are
reasonable independent grounds for such treatment. Proceeding on this
basis, the court again noted that the wife was a member of a class of
50 Comment, 54 CAxi. L. REv. 252i 263 (1966).
51 Ibtd.
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persons who lost the protection available to them m Illinois if a divorce
had been granted there prior to her departure. She would be demed
the benefit of the Illinois law and, but for the quasi-community legisla-
tion, she would receive no protection in Califorma. Therefore, any
discrimnation is reasonable and not within the ambit of the forms of
disparity guarded against by the Constitution.
Here again the court used the same approach to uphold the legis-
lation against the privileges and immunities argument as it advanced
in the due process portion of its opinion; that is, the wife's need for
protection, and the substantial interest that the state has m affording
her it, outweighs the individual property rights of the husband.
Reverting again to Thornton for comparative purposes, it appears
that this is a -second inroad into the logic and ]udicial analysis ex-
pounded there. Thornton gave vent to the view that any type of dis-
cnmmation would be unconstitutional so long as it was different than
the method of dealing with native doniciliaries. Unlike Addison, it
made no attempt to justify some disparity irrespective of any com-
pelling reasons. Even so, the court would be hard put to justify the
alteration of property rights because of the move itself, as the legisla-
tion in Thornton attempted to do. At that time the state has no pre-
dominant interests m rearranging the spouses' rights m property then
owned.
Perhaps much of the confusion that has been created over the
privileges and immunities bar to any form of retroactive legislation
has been fostered by a failure to analyze the community and common
law forms of ownership in their proper perspectives. The use of the
retroactive argument to negate the validity of legislation increasing
the wife's interest in presently existing community property has been
supported by appeals to due process; that is, the husband's rights are
being constricted arbitrarily Even so, it does not follow that a migrant
wife cannot be given any rights m property acquired while domiciled
elsewhere because of a denial of a husband's rights as a citizen. The
husband's separate property, as that term is used in California, is not
being affected by the quasi-community legislation. It concerns only
the property acquired subsequent to the marriage. This would have
been community had it been acquired while the spouses were donn-
ciled in California and is the same type of property in which the native
wife has certain rights. Hence, the state is trying to treat the migrant
wife in the same fashion. As far as the wife is concerned the statute
attempts to equate instead of discriminate, but the husband is suffer-
ing a diminution of property interests. As seen above, however, this
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may be done where it is justified by public interests. Here it may be
permissible even though an extension of the wife's interest in already
existing community property may violate the due process clause. In
the latter situation, the wife is protected enough so that the husband's
rights may be predominant over any public interest. Therefore, the
main obstacle to such legislation seems to be one of due process, which
the court successfully hurdled in Addison, and not one of privileges
and mmunities.
Lastly, the Addison court had to determine whether the legisla-
tion was being applied retroactively Notwithstanding the fact that the
parties moved to Califorma in 1949 and the legislation was promul-
gated in 1961, the court, by judicial sleight of hand, held that it was
not. Since the statute neither created nor altered any property rights
until the divorce was granted, and since the divorce decree was not
entered until after the adoption of the statute, it was reasoned that
it was being given prospective application only. The question of retro-
activity was answered by its avoidance.
Addison has been criticized because of its failure to meet this issue
directly 5 2 The court may have been unwilling, at this particular time,
to overrule Spreckels v. Spreckels,3 where the problem of retroactivity
was germinated, or that portion of Thornton which relied so heavily
upon it. Whatever the reason for this omission, Thornton has been
severely restricted by Addison inasmuch as the court had already
pointed out that retroactivity of this type of legislation would not
render it void even though property rights of natives could not be so
expanded, provided that there were adequate independent reasons
for this disparity They were present in the instant case in the necessity
of giving the wife some protection where she would otherwise have
received none. Even if the court had held that the statute was retro-
active in nature it could still have applied it under its former inter-
pretation of the privileges and immunities clause. Furthermore, the
court, while not overruling Spreckels, does encroach upon the doctrine
there expounded. Under Spreckels the rights of the parties would have
been governed by the law in existence at the time of their move to
California in 1949 and not by that operational at the time of the
divorce. What the court failed to do directly it accomplished indirectly
and indicated a willingness to retreat, to some extent, from the older
rule which absolutely prescribed any retroactive application of such
legislation.
52Id. at 266-68; Comment, 18 STAN. L. REv. 514, 521 (1966).
.53 116 Cal. 339, 48 Pac. 228 (1897).
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Nevertheless, still unanswered is the exact effect of the restriction
on Spreckles msofar as alterations of presently existing interests in
community property are concerned. Some clues are evident though.
If vested rights of migratory spouses can be realigned in full compliance
with due process, it would appear that the right of native Californians
could be treated in a like fashion if a substantial interest of the state
can be shown to justify it. The latter may be more difficult because the
wife's need for protection is less, but the possibility is definitely there.
Far more important, as far as this paper is concerned, is that Addison
does not clearly delineate the extent to which the property rights of
migratory spouses can be altered. Thornton's logic against any rear-
rangement of interests between living spouses is obviously nullified,
but Addison is just as explicit in noting that the quasi-community
legislation is not being applied during the existence of the conjugal
relationship. Thornton was willing to concede that a realignment could
validly occur where the marriage was terminated by death if proper
legislation was designed for this purpose,"4 and Addison extended this
concession to a termination by divorce. Even so, it should be reiterated
that Addison does not rule favorably, or at all, on the question of
when, if ever, some alteration may occur during the marriage. Suppose
that Califorma adopted a statute which prohibited the husband from
selling his quasi-community property for less than an adequate and full
consideration unless he first obtain the consent of his wife as he would
be required to do if it were true community 5 5 Could the rationale of
Addison be extended to uphold its validity? If the wife could show
a preconcerted effort on the part of the husband to systematically dis-
pose of property in such a fashion as to prevent her from receiving
any benefit therefrom, the balancing of interests theory might be ap-
plicable notwithstanding the patent fact that the marriage had not
been terminated. This is particularly true if a divorce was in the ofng
or could reasonably be anticipated. It might be more difficult if rela-
tions were otherwise amicable and the wife had other assets sufficient
to satisfy her every need.
Conversely, could the quasi-community property be placed under
the management and control of the husband even where the wife had
earned a portion of it while domiciled in the common law jurisdiction?
Such would be true of community property with the exception of any
money earned by the wife that had been segregated and not com-
5' See In re Miller, 31 Cal. 2d 191, 187 P.2d 722 (1947) where such an addition
to the probate code was upheld against constitutional arguments.
55 See CAL. Cr. CoDE § 172.
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mingled with other community property 51 It is extremely doubtful
that Addison would apply here. It is difficult to visualize any great
interest that the state has that would override the ability of an other-
wise competent person to manage her own property
Thus, one lesson to -be drawn from Thornton still survives Addison,
and that is the inability of the state to produce a wholesale transmu-
tation of the separate property of either spouse into community prop-
-erty as a result of the change of domicile. The importance of Addison,
however, is in its demonstration that other methods of equalizing the
-positions of native and nigratory spouses are avaliable and may be
utilized so long as they are justified by the substantial interest which
the domiciliary state has in according the migrant spouse the needed
protection. Addison is another milestone in the attempts of California
to do this but it does not resolve all of the questions. Each new piece
of legislation will have to be tested against the precepts enunciated in
this latest attempt to remedy an old and often troublesome problem.
While these additions to the California law place the migrant wife
in a much better position that she previously enjoyed and her -rights
are in accord with those of a wife who, along with her husband, resided
in that state during the entire duration of the marital relationship,
yet her non-vested interests would be affected in certain situations.
If, at the time of the marriage in a common law state where both
spouses were domiciled, the husband owned any property the wife
would acquire an expectancy therein through her statutory rights
which could not be destroyed by the husband while they remained
there. Suppose that during the honeymoon the husband becomes dis-
gruntled with his new bride and upon returning home, he decides to,
and does in fact, establish a domicile in California. After reaching his
new home he executes a will wherein his wife is not mentioned. He
acquires no property subsequent to the move and while chasing a
starlet across Hollywood at Vine is struck and killed by an automobile.
When the will is offered for probate, the wife intervenes and seeks a
share of his estate. To what is she entitled? Apparently nothing since
the property belonged to hin before the marriage and thus not within
the new provision of the Probate Code. If the parties had been domi-
ciled in California at the time of its acquisition it would have still
have been the separate property of the husband and, under the law of
that state, a person may devise his separate property as he pleases."7
True, this is what the native California wife would have gotten, and
56 CAL. CIV. CODE § 171C.
57 CAL. NROB. CODE § 20.
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since the husband was domiciled there at the time of his death and
the interests of the wife were not vested but were inchoate, there is
no constitutional problem; but, had the spouses remained in the com-
mon law state the wife would have been entitled to her statutory
share. To this extent, her interests, though only in the form of an
expectancy, were affected by the change of domicile.
Apparently, the California legislature never considered whether
the migrant wife in this factual situation should receive any interest in
her husband's property upon his death, or if it did they decided against
it. It may be reasonably inferred that such protection was intentionally
omitted since the native wife would receive nothing m identical cir-
cumstances. In any event, this illustrates the nature of the interest
now destroyed by the change of domicile, -.e., an expectancy
I. Idaho
The only decision of the Supreme Court of Idaho on this precise
issue involved a case where the spouses moved to that state from
Colorado."" After the move the husband purchased some real estate
with money he had previously earned while he and his wife were
living in the common law state. Upon the death of his wife the ad-
ministrator included one-half of the newly acquired realty in her estate
on the theory that it was community property, it having been acquired
subsequent to the marriage.
When the husband objected to this characterization of the realty,
the court upheld his contentions stating that when he left Colorado
the property belonged to him as a part of his separate estate and "it
would take something more than the mere crossing of the state line
to transfer title to property he had with him."' In expounding on this
interstate crossing, the court was undoubtedly pondering the same
constitutional issues which forced the California court to declare the
early legislation of that state invalid in Thornton.60
In arnving at their decision the court refused to accept the argu-
ment of the administrator that to inquire into the law of Colorado and
to enforce it in Idaho was contrary to sound legal principles inasmuch
as it amounted to the execution of a foreign law The court denied that
their opinion had this effect. It was not enforcing a foreign law, but
was merely using it as one of the probative facts in establishing the
true ownership of the property This was based upon the general and
5s Douglas v. Douglas, 22 Idaho 336, 125 Pac. 796 (1912).
59 Id. at 343, 125 Pac. at 798.
60 This case was discussed m section II supra.
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often quoted conflicts rule that interests in personal property are
governed by the law of the spouses' matrnonal domicile. To so use
foreign law was not the equivalent of the relegation of the law of the
forum to any inferior position.
After ascertaining that the purchase price was the separate property
of the husband, the court then used the law of Idaho to determine the
respective interests of the spouses in real property located there. The
investment of the funds into the realty was not considered as being
sufficient to divest the husband of his title to the purchase price. This
was nothing more than an exchange of one class of property for an-
other "and it is well settled that investing one land or class or specie
of property in another kind or class does not change the character of
the title or right of ownership, and that the title by which the prop-
erty was held and governed will continue the same."("
The court did not say, nor did it intimate, what additional factor
would have been necessary to affect the husband's right of ownership
in this property brought into the community state. Nevertheless, any
conduct on his part which clearly evinces a desire or determination to
vest some portion thereof, or some interest therein, in his wife would
certainly be sufficient. There were no real barriers if he had wanted
such a divestiture.
The Idaho decision is identical with that enunciated by the Arizona
court,62 and its overall effect is the same as that which would be arrived
at under an application of the Arizona statute which provides that the
acquisitions made in that state by spouses now domiciled there who
were married elsewhere are to be governed by the law of Arizona.63
The law of the community state is used m both instances, that is, in
Arizona under the statute and in Idaho in the absence of such a statute.
In neither, however, is it applied blindly without any other considera-
tion. In both states the law of the spouses' former domicile was used
to ascertain the respective interests of each marital partner in the pur-
chase funds. The law of the forum was then used to maintain and
protect those interests notwithstanding any subsequent transmutations.
The important factor is that in neither state was the separate char-
acter of any property destroyed or altered by its introduction into the
community property jurisdiction, nor by its investment in, or exchange
for, other property after the change of domicile.
6122 Idaho at 343, 125 Pac. at 798.
62 Stephen v. Stephen, 36 Anz. 235, 284 Pab. 158 (1930) discussed m section I
supra.
63Am. REv. STAT. ANN. § 25-217,(1956).
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IV. Louisiana
As early as 1826, the courts of Louisiana were called upon to deter-
mine the effect of an interstate move into that jurisdiction. 4 The hus-
band and wife were married in South Carolina under whose law the
personal property owned by the wife at the tune of, or acquired sub-
sequent to, the marriage became vested in full ownership m her hus-
band as a consequence of the matrimoial union. After they moved
to Louisiana the husband purchased some real estate with the person-
alty thus acquired. When he died all of the property left by him was
treated as community property by the probate court. In reversing the
decision of the lower court, the Supreme Court of Louisiana held that
while it was the general rule that marriage superimposes a community
of gains and acquests between the spouses and all the property m
existence at the death of either is presumed to be community property,
the presumption could be rebutted. This was successfully done by
showing that the property belonged to the husband according to the
law of the spouses' matrimomal domicile. His sole ownership therein
was then traced into the subsequently acquired realty with the result
that its status as separate property continued through the investment.
In later cases, the court held that when a married couple moves to
Louisiana with property from a common law Jurisdiction where the
general rule prevails that the husband acquires the wife's interests in
her personal property, that property will continue to belong to the
husband unless the wife can establish that he never obtained any
ownerslp rights therein under the law of their former domiciliary
state.65 Therefore, the change of domicile will not of itself cause the
property to be treated as community property Neither will it produce
a reinvestment thereof into the wife's separate estate.66 Since it be-
longed to the husband at the time of the move and his title is not
affected thereby, all of the incidents of ownership are still in vogue.
Hence, his creditors may attach the property after the move in satis-
faction of his debts just as they could have done prior to the change
of domicile.67
While the original property may be owned by either spouse, any
property acquired subsequent to the move is, by statute, presumed to
have been purchased for the community in the absence of any proof
64 Tanner v. Robert, 8 Mart. 508 (La. 1826).
65 Martin v. Boler, 13 La. Ann. 369 (1858); Penny v. Weston, 4 Rob. 165 (La.
1843).
66 Hayden v. Nutt, 4 La. Ann. 65 (1849),
7 Slocomb v. Breedlove, 8 La. 143, 28 Am. Dec. 135 (1835).
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to the contrary6 This presumption is applicable irrespective of
whether the property is acquired with the subsequent earnings of the
the spouses or is received in exchange for the property brought from
the common law state.
In Fleming v. Fleming,9 the parties moved from Minnesota bring-
mg with them funds accumulated after their marriage. The husband
purchased stock in a Louisiana corporation with the record title being
taken in only his name. The wife predeceased her husband and her
heirs claimed a one-half interest in this stock. In awarding judgment
in favor of the heirs the court held that when the spouses changed
their domicile to Louisiana they came under the community property
system with respect to any subsequent acquisitions. One of the features
of the community regime is that any property purchased by either
spouse during the marital relationship, even though acquired in the
name of only one of them, is presumptively the property of the com-
munity In the present case no proof was offered as to the respective
interests of either spouse m the Minnesota finds. Hence, the presump-
tion was not successfully rebutted.
It is difficult to say wthether the Louisiana position is any different
from that of Arizona and Idaho. Certainly as regards the actual sep-
arate property of either spouse brought into the state they are identical.
The difference, if any, occurs in the treatment of the property received
in exchange therefor subsequent to the move.
There are two possible interpretations of this aspect of the above
Louisiana case. If the court meant that the burden was upon the
party claiming any of this as separate property to establish that it
had been purchased with funds which comprised a portion of his or
her separate estate, there is no difference since the same duty likewise
prevailed in Arizona and Idaho. However, the Louisiana court stated
that there was nothing in the facts to indicate that when the husband
bought the stock he did not do so for the community Taken literally,
this means that notwithstanding the fact that the purchase funds can
be shown to have been the separate property of one of the spouses,
the new property will still be characterized as community unless it can
be clearly shown that, at the date of acquisition, the spouse intended
for it to continue as separate. The presumption contained in this
second interpretation would be exceedingly difficult to rebut, especially
where the spouse making the exchange or investment has died. It
would be far easier to trace is or her separate funds into the new prop-
6 8 LA. Crv. CoDE ANN. arts. 2401-02 (West 1952)..
69211 La. 860, 30 So. 2d 860 (1947).
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erty than to establish what his or her mental intention was at tins
prior date.
The latter interpretation is given impetus by the court's statement
that in its view of the case it mattered not whether the funds were
the sole property of the husband or belonged jointly to the husband
and wife. This is definitely indicative that the Louisiana presumption
is not merely one that all property acquired after the change of domi-
cile is community Rather, it presupposes that the property is acquired
for the community, making tins the object of rebuttal.
Taken from this vantage point, the Louisiana statute, unlike the one
before the Califorma court in the Thornton case, would not create any
constitutional hazards. It does not work a conversion of the spouses'
separate property into community merely because it is transported into
the state. On the contrary, this property is not affected in any manner.
The statute has reference to that property acquired after the change of
domicile, and then only to the extent that when a spouse invests his or
her separate property he or she is presumed to be acting on behalf of
the community True, this is not a succession statute and it does operate
to change the ownership interests of living spouses, but since both the
parties and the property are within the state there is no reason why
the domiciliary law could not be applied to these subsequent trans-
actions.70 Both Arizona71 and Idaho72 would agree in this regard but
this does not mean that the original interests of the spouses are de-
stroyed, for if they can successfully rebut the presumption that all of
,the property accumulated after their marriage is community property,
their separate interests will be traced into the new acquisitions where
they will be recognized and protected.
An additional factor which may aid the contention in favor of the
constitutionality of the Louisiana statute is that it may be fairly pre-
sumed that the spouses are consenting to the alteration of their owner-
ship interests by this subsequent investment or exchange. If this is not
their intention they are given the opportunity to show otherwise. The
presumption is rebuttable, not conclusive. Thus, the property interest
of neither spouse is being taken arbitrarily or capriciously nor is it
being taken in violation of the due process clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.
7 0 See RFSTATEMENT (SEcoND), Co'rnucr op LAWS § 292 (Tent. Draft No. 5,
1959).
71The Arizona statute specifically provides that the rights and interests of the
spouses mn any property acquired while domiciled ms that state are to be governed by
the law of Arizona although they were married elsewhere. A=u. -Ev. STAT. ANN.
§ 25-217 (1956).
72Douglas v. Douglas, 22 Idaho 336, 125 Pac. 796 (1912).
January, 1967]
THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
The court did not state what type of evidence would be sufficient
to rebut this presumption of community benefit but it unequivocably
shows that the record title alone is not enough. Undoubtedly, a nota-
tion in the instrument or document of title that the property was
received in exchange for separate property, and that it was not ac-
quired for or on behalf of the community, would suffice. Between these
two extremes it would simply be a question of proof as to what the
spouses had intended at the time that the exchange or conversion
took place.
V. Nevada
Nevada has apparently had no occasion to express its opiion as
to the effect of a change of domicile from a common law state into
that jurisdiction upon the respective property interests of each spouse.
VI. New Mexico
The Supreme Court of New Mexico was confronted with this
issue when a husband and wife moved to that state where the husband
purchased a farm with the proceeds of his separate property that he
owned in Illinois prior to the change of donucile." While residing at
their new home, the husband continued to sell more of his Illinois
property and received a total of about $60,000 in return for such dis-
positions. He was engaged in the business of loaning money and of
purchasing and improvmg real estate for sale, and this money was
used by him in the operation of these two enterprises. At the time of
his death his estate contained some $30,000. The trial court character-
ized this as community property although the wife could testify to
nothing which would indicate the existence of any other community
property with which the husband's separate property could have be-
come commmgled.
The appellate court reversed because "it would be extraordinary
if the decedent, who started with $60,000 of separate capital and no
community capital, had finished his business career with $30,000 of
community property and no separate estate."7 4 This logic was sufficient
to refute the presumption that any property acquired during or sub-
sequent to the marriage belongs to the community By allowing such
proof, the separate property was not recharacterized as community
by the change of domicile nor by its reinvestment thereafter.
The presumption that all property accumulated during the marital
78 In re Faulkner's Estate, 35 N.M. 125, 290 Pac. 801 (1930).
741d. at 128, 290,Pac. at 802.
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relationship belongs to the community is identical with that m Arizona
and Idaho. Likewise, the burden is on the person claiming it as a por-
tion of his or her separate estate to establish its separate character by
a preponderance of the evidence. Therefore, it is not surprising that
the New Mexico court reached the same conclusion as did Arizona 5
and Idaho.7
This is in marked contrast, however, to the Louisiana presumption
that any property purchased subsequent to the change of domicile is
acquired for the benefit of the community 77 Had the same facts as
existed in the New Mexico case been presented to the Louisiana court,
the evidence would probably have not been sufficient to successfully
rebut the presumption. Even though the purchase money was separate
property and it could be traced into the subsequent acquisitions it
would still have been virtually impossible to have shown, particularly
after the husband's death, that when he was dealing with this prop-
erty he intended it to remain as separate rather than become a portion
of the community estate. This is true although there is relatively little
doubt as to his actual preference. The problem comes in trying to
establish this in the face of the Louisiana presumption.
VII. Texas
In Vardeman v. Lawson78 a mother bequeathed certain personalty
in trust for the use of her daughter, but in no way was it to be sub-
jected to the liabilities or contract obligations of her husband. The will
further stipulated that if the daughter survived her husband or if they
should receive a divorce the property would, upon the happening of
either contingent event, vest in her absolutely A divorce was obtained,
the property was taken possession of by the daughter and she re-
married. All of these events transpired in Alabama. After her second
marriage the spouses moved to Texas where part of this property was
used in the purchase of real estate. Thereafter, the husband entered
into a contract to sell the land and when he refused to execute the
necessary instruments of conveyance the vendee instituted an action
for specific performance. The wife intervened and claimed the land
as her separate estate because it had been purchased with the funds
she had received from the estate of her mother.
75 Stephen v. Stephen, 36 Anz. 235, 284 Pac. 158 (1930) discussed m section I
supra.
76Douglas v. Douglas, 22 Idaho 336, 125 Pac. 796 (1912).
77 LA. Civ. CoDE ANN. art. 2401 (West 1952).
78 17 Tex. 10 (1856).
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Specific performance was ordered and the wife's allegations dis-
posed of by the conclusion that when she obtained the divorce from
her first husband the property became vested in her absolutely and
thus, having the complete ownership, she might divest herself of it as
she desired. This she did by virtue of her remarriage and her husband,
under the law of Alabama, acquired it as his property Having obtained
the property in Alabama the husband's ownership therein was not
destroyed by the change of domicile to the community property juns-
diction nor by its subsequent investment into Texas real estate.
The court reached the same result when the heirs of a wife claimed
all the real property purchased in Texas by a married couple, after a
change of domicile, should be classified as community property The
purchase price was paid with money amassed by the joint efforts of
the spouses while residing in Georgia. "Admitting that the common
law was the law of marital rights in the State of Georgia at the time
this money was acquired," the court concluded that "it vested in the
husband as his separate estate; and the purchase being made with
this fund, the property remained the separate estate of the husband.""O
A third case involved a husband and wife who moved from Ten-
nessee and purchased Texas realty '0 It was paid for partly with funds
owned by the wife at the date of their marriage and partly with the
husband's separate property The court held that when the parties
married, the wife's property became, by reason of the principles of
the common law then in effect in Tennessee, "a gift from the wife to
the husband, and thus, by the force of such law, became a part of his
separate estate, and, upon removal here, remained so "81 There-
fore, the property for which it was exchanged, or in which it was in-
vested, was also the separate property of the husband.
The court did not, m any of these cases, make an elaborate expla-
nation of its judicial reasoning. It sinply said that since the property
was separate when introduced into the community state it remained
as such and was not affected by the subsequent transactions in-
volving it.
In a later case concerning property acquired in Massachusetts, it
was argued that to use the law of Massachusetts amounted to the
enforcement of the law of a sister state by a Texas court in the disposi-
tion of real property located there" Not true, stated the court. It was
merely ascertaining the foreign law as a matter of fact in determining
79 Oliver v. Robertson, 41 Tex. 422, 425 (1874).
s9 McDamel v. Harley, 42 S.W 323 (Tex. Civ. App. 1897).
81 Id. at 325.
8 2 Blethen v. Bonner, 30 Tex. Civ. App. 585, 71 S.W 290 (Civ. App. 1902).
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the title to property acquired there. After thus determining the char-
acter of the purchase funds the law of Texas would be applied.83
The court jocularly clided Massachusetts on that segment of her
law that permitted the husband to acquire title to his wife's personalty
upon their marriage. It seemed to the court that Massachusetts, the
boasted center of advanced thought, should have long ago discarded
tins doctrine and have relegated it to its place among the rejected
barbarisms of the common law84 But, whatever may have been its
objection to this particular aspect of the common law, or its admira-
tion for the community system which permitted the parties to share
in the fruits of their joint endeavors, the Texas court felt that the
power of Massachusetts to determine how her citizens could acquire
and hold property was unquestionable. Neither did the court deem its
authority to extend to the alteration of the status of any property, the
ownership of which was vested by such foreign law before its intro-
duction into that state.
This is very similar to the position taken by the California court
in the Thornton case, 5 i.e., vested interests are not affected by the
change of domicile to the community state. The Texas decision should
be viewed more closely The court was obviously not holding that
any transactions concerning this property and occurring subsequent
to the move could not in any respect be governed by the law of Texas.
Nor was the court foreclosing the possibility of applying a succession
statute if one had been in existence. The law of Texas could be ex-
tended to govern either, or both, of these hypotheticals under the
proper circumstances.86 These were not the facts before the court in
this particular case and, in the absence of any such statute, the separate
property interests of neither spouse were affected or altered in any
respect.
The courts of Texas will not take judicial notice of the laws or a
common law junsdiction from which the spouses moved and if they
are not offered in evidence the property will be presumed to belong
to the community 11 Where the party asserting the separate character
of the property is able to rebut this presumption, Texas has consistently
upheld the separate characterization thereof. Neither does the subse-
83 This is identical to the rebuttal made by Idaho to the same argument, which
is discussed m section III supra.
84 Massachusetts has now abolished this rule. MAss. GCR. Aws ANN. ch. 209,
§ 1 (1955).
85 Section II supra.
86 MO.
S Griffin v. McKinney, 25 Tex. Civ. App. 432, 62 S.W 78 (Civ. App. 1901).
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quent investment of the separate property of either spouse in Texas
real estate, nor its exchange for other personalty, cause it to lose its
previous status as separate and become community."
VIII. Washington
Shortly after its adlmssion to the Union, the State of Washington
was called upon to determine whether the property acquired by a
wife in a common law state was liable for the debts of her husband.89
The property came into the wife's possession in a jurisdiction where it
was immune to the husband's liabilities. The court held that whatever
label was placed on the property in the state where it was acquired,
"it was in effect her separate property, and the laws of this state do
not undertake to change the status or liability of such property merely
by its coming across our border."90 The language used by the court in
its expression of opinion is almost identical with that used by Idaho
under similar circumstances in a later case.9'
This position was further elucidated in the leading Washington
case of Brookman v. Durkee92 where the husband invested money in
Washington real estate while retaining the common law domicile. The
funds had been accumulated by him in the course of his business
while he and his wife were domiciled in New York under whose law
personal property acquired by a husband, during the marital relation-
ship, became his separate .property with the wife having no interest
which she could dispose of during his lifetime. Her only rights therein
were in the form of an expectancy which did not ripen into possession
and enjoyment until the death of her husband. The wife predeceased
him and, upon ins death, her heirs claimed a share of the Washington
realty as community property They based their contentions on the
definition of community property as promulgated by the legislature,
and asserted that the statute was a general one which made no distinc-
tion between property acquired within the state by spouses who were
domiciled there and property acquired elsewhere and later transported
into Washington.
In answering their allegations, the court stated that they did not
think that the legislature could have intended that no distinction
should be made between property acquired wholly within the state
S8 Blethen v. Bonner, 30 Tex. Civ. App. 585, 71 S.W 290 (Civ. App. 1902).
89 Freeburger v. Gazzam, 5 Wash. 772, 32 Pae. 732 (1893).
90 Id. at 773, 32 Pac. at 733.
91 Douglas v. Douglas, 22 Idaho 336, 343, 125 Pac. 796, 798 (1912).
9246 Wash. 578, 90 Pac. 914 (1907).
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of Washington by the ]omt efforts of the spouses while they were
domiciled there, and property acquired by them while residing else-
where and then removed to the state. Even if it had intended that
this property should become community property upon its introduc-
tion into the state its legality could be seriously questioned. It would
destroy vested rights by taking "from one of the spouses property over
which he or she had sole and absolute dominon and ownership, and
vest an interest therein in the other.. ,s Therefore, the court
opined that it was clear:
that personal property acquired by either husband or wife in
a foreign jurisdiction, winch is by the law of the place where ac-
quired the separate property of one or the other of the spouses, con-
tinues to be the separate property of that spouse when brought within
thfs state; and it being the separate property of that spouse owning
and bringing it here, property in this state, whether real or personal,
received in exchange for it, or purchased by it if it be money, is also
the separate property of each spouse.9
The actual question before the court involved the testamentary
distribution of Washington real estate. Hence, the court applied its
own law insofar as the distribution of the property was concerned, but
in determining what property was to be included in the decedent's
estate the court looked to the law of the state in which the personalty
was originally acquired. Unless the decedent had some interest in the
property according to the law of that state, there would be nothing
to which the succession statute of Washington could be applied. This
is not to suggest that Washington could not enact a valid succession
statute which would have covered the facts of this case, but only that
the definition of community property could not be so expanded for
this purpose.
If the court had upheld the contentions advanced by the heirs, the
Washington definition would have been the same as the community
property definition contained in the California statute invalidated in
Thornton. While the Thornton decision came later, the same reasons
given there against the constitutionality of that statute were un-
doubtedly the underlying factors for the court's statement that to
adopt the argument of the wife's heirs, as to the breadth of the Wash-
ington statute, would raise serious questions as to its legality and
enforceability
93 Id. at 583, 90 Pac. at 915.
4 Ibtd. Other Washngton cases are Myers v. Vayette, 146 Wash. 1, 261 Pac. 647
(1927); Meyers v. Albert, 76 Wash. 218, 135 Pac. 1003 (1913); Elliott v. Hawley,
34 Wash. 585, 76 Pac. 93 (1904).
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It was not until 1932 that a case was decided where the domicile
of the parties was also changed, but the court held that the separate
property of neither spouse was affected by the interstate move."5 This
applied with equal weight to any proceeds subsequently received
therefrom, provided they could be traced and it could be established
that they were derived from the property originally brought into the
state.
With respect to the investment of the funds in real estate after the
change of domicile, the title thereto vested at the time of the purchase
and if the purchase money was separate property this characterization
would follow into the realty If the purchase price of the real estate
was partially paid with the funds brought from the common law state
and partially with community property, the separate property of the
vendee spouse continued in proportion to the amount paid with the
original property However, if the separate funds were commingled
with other community property acquired after the move so that the
identity thereof was lost, it would all become community and the
separate property would be destroyed in the process.
In a very recent case, the husband moved to Washington, after his
wife had been committed to a mental institution in North Dakota, and
purchased real estate located there."6 He later sold the property to
some of his relatives who were familiar with the disability of his wife.
No one represented the wife in the sale and the husband's signature
was the only one affixed to the conveyancing instrument as the vendor.
When the husband died the vendees brought an action to quiet title
asserting that this property was a part of the deceased husband's
separate estate. They made no effort to show that the land had been
purchased with funds brought by the husband from the common law
state but alleged that the law of community property was inapplicable
in this instance on the theory that the domicile of the wife did not
follow that of the husband when he moved but remained in North
Dakota where she was confined.
The court held that whatever the validity of the argument that
the spouses had established separate domiciles, it did not solve the
problem before them because, even if this be admitted as true, the
marriage relationship had not been severed thereby Furthermore,
there was still the presumption that all property acquired in. Wash-
ington by either spouse during coverture was community property and
this inference was applicable here since the controversy revolved
95Estate of Gulstine, 166 Wash. 325, 6 P.2d 628 (1932).
96 Rustad v. Rustad, 61 Wash. 2d 176, 377 P.2d 414 (1963).
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around Washington real estate. The person contending that it was
separate property had the burden of proving otherwise. Inasmuch as
the husband had acquired other property after the move and the
vendees offered no evidence to establish the separate character of the
purchase money, the burden of proving that the real estate was not
community property had not been sustained.
This case in no way affected the previous decisions of the court
that separate property acquired in a common law state was not con-
verted into community property by its investment in Washington
realty The vendees simply failed to offer any proof that the purchase
money had ever been the husband's separate property Hence, the
presumption in favor of the community was not successfully overcome.
For some reason, they did not avail themselves of the correct avenue
of approach.
IX. Other Decisions
At least one common law court has had the opportunity to deter-
mine the effect of a change of domicile to a community property juris-
diction. In Bosma v. Harder9 7 the spouses moved from Oregon to Idaho
with the husband bringing funds accumulated in their former domi-
cile. These were deposited in an Idaho bank in his name. He later
gave the money to his brothers and, upon his death, the wife claimed
that it had been given away in contravention of her rights and sought
to recover it. The husband's ability to make a present of this money
to anyone other than bis wife depended upon whether it was cate-
gorized as community property under the law of Idaho or as his
separate property according to the law of Oregon.
The Oregon court held that it was not community property because
if property is acquired in a state where the community system of
property ownership is unknown, it does not lose its characterization
when later transported into a community jurisdiction but retains- its
status as separate property. This is in line with the reasoning of the
courts in the community states and the result is identical to what it
would have been if the decision had been rendered by the Idaho
court instead of the Oregon tribunal. 8
X. Summary and Comparison with Approach
of Common Law States
California is the only community jurisdiction that has enacted
specific legislation directly geared toward any solution of the prob-
97 94 Ore. 219, 185 Pac. 741 (1919).
98 Section II supra.
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lems created by a change of domicile from one property system to
another. In fact, she stands alone in this endeavor. While all may not
agree with the effect produced by the addition of the quasi-community
type of property,9 9 its ability to legislate in tins area in a proper fash-
ion is unquestionable. As has been seen above,00 the differentiation
between the constitutional and unconstitutional approach revolves
around, and is dependent upon, the non-affectation of vested property
interests merely because of a change of domicile. Legislation govern-
ing the method of intestate succession and the power of testamentary
disposition is appropriate since these are permissible fields of coverage
by the decedent's domicile. Likewise, it may guarantee protection to
the wife when the marriage is terminated by a divorce, and under the
logic of Addison the respective interests of each spouse in the quasi-
community property could be altered where the interest of the state
outweighs that of the individual.
Moreover, the Califorma legislation is of tremendous importance
to the attorney in that state who is trying to advise his mobile clients
from a common law Jurisdiction. He does not have to worry about
tracing problems except insofar as the spouses may have other prop-
erty which would have been classified as the separate property of one
of them if they had been domiciled in Califorma at the time of its
acquisition. Granted, some tracing problems may be thrust upon him
in order to protect their separate interests under these particular facts
but they will not be as difficult, nor should they occur with as great a
frequency, as they would in the absence of such a statute. Neither
will he be faced with having to speculate on what type of evidence
will be sufficient to rebut a particular form of presumption. His advice
may be dispensed with a greater degree of certainty than can presently
be afforded by his counterparts in the common law states or by some
of his legal brethren in other community jurisdictions where the pre-
sumption in favor of the community prevails and must be rebutted
to save the separate interests of each spouse.
In the other seven community states where no comparable legisla-
99 See section II supra where the view was expressed that it might be desirable
to enact some legislation for the protection of a wife whose husband has some separate
property acquired before their marriage in the common law state, but ha. no other prop-
erty which could be characterized as quasi-community. Otherwise, she may be deprived
of all interests upon the death of her husband since he may dispose of his separate
property according to his own wishes and her expectancy therein has been lost by their
change of domicile to the community state. For a recent article expressing doubts about
some of the constitutional features of the Califorma legislation, see deFumak, Conflict
of Laws zn the Community Property Field, 7 Amiz. L. BEv. 50, 52-55 (1985).
100 Section II supra.
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tion exists, there has never been a decision which would cause a
spouse's separate property to be converted into community property
merely because of its introduction into the community state. On the
contrary, they have consistently held that the separate property of
either party retains its status as such. This is the same type of result
reached by the common law courts with regard to the introduction
of community property into a common law state when the move has
been in that direction. The move itself does not produce a conversion.101
Although these community states have presumptions that any
property acquired after the spouses move there belongs to the com-
munity, these are rebuttable and if the party, asserting the property
to be separate, can meet this required burden of proof his or her
separate property will remain iviolate through the transmutation.
This is usually done by establishing that the property was acquired
in and brought from a common law state and was the separate prop-
erty of one of the spouses at the date of its introduction into the
community state, or that tls separate property was invested in, or
exchanged for, that involved. Additional proof is apparently essential
in Louisiana where it must be shown that any property acquired sub-
sequent to the change of domicile was not purchased for, nor on
behalf of, the community The mere tracing of the separate property
into that obtained will not suffice. The intention of the investing spouse
must be ascertained, and when determined it governs whether the
separate characterization continues.
This rebutting evidence is all that is needed. The community states
have never used any equitable doctrine such as a constructive or re-
sulting trust, in protecting the original character of the property, as
the common law states have done when community funds were in-
vested in realty situated within their territorial limits.102 No common
law state has ever held the property to be community after the move
although the interest of the wife has always been protected either by
the application of a constructive trust theory or by a rationalization
toward some analogous common law form of ownership such as a joint
tenancy Perhaps this can simply be attributed to the fact that com-
munity states do have a separate property classification whereas no
community property characterization exists m a common law state; it
being completely foreign to that system of jurisprudence. Whatever
101 See Drake v. Clover, 30 Ala. 382 (1857); Doss v. Campbell, 19 Ala. 590, 54
Am. Dec. 198 (1851); Walack v. Walack, 211 Ga. 745, 88 S.E.2d 154 (1955); Beard's
Ex'r v. Basye, 46 Ky. 133 (1846).
io2 fDepas v. Mayo, 11 Mo. 314, 49 Am. Dec. 88 (1848); Edwards v. Edwards,
108 Okla. 93, 233 Pac. 477 (1924).
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the variations in the methods of approach, the results have been essen-
tiarlly the same in that vested property interests possessed in one state
were not destroyed by a change of domicile to a jurisdiction where
another system of property ownership prevails.
No common law state has promulgated any statutes to solve this
problem, but the trials and errors of the California legislature in at-
temptig to produce a workable scheme of legislation can be extremely
helpful to the common law states in their consideration and formula-
tion of a much needed statutory remedy The lessons of Thornton and
Addison are plain.
